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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
PRODUCTION, 1990-2009
Michael Heise*
Inspired by the retirement of Professor Tom Ulen of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, the author considers the growth and development of
empirical legal scholarship over two decades-a period of time that
corresponds, not coincidentally, with Professor Ulen's career. Start-
ing in the 1990s when empirical scholarship had not yet "caught on,"
the author first documents the increase in quantity of empirical schol-
arship over two decades. Next, the author applies a law and econom-
ics perspective to the recent surge in empirical scholarship, explaining
that the trend has been fueled by an increase in the number of empiri-
cally trained scholars and also by increased demand for this type of
scholarship. The author concludes by reflecting on Professor Ulen's
contribution to legal scholarship and suggests the time has come to
ask not whether empirical legal scholarship has arrived but why it
took so long to do so.
Retirements, such as Professor Tom Ulen's, fuel reflection. In addi-
tion to backward glances, reflection often prompts one to take stock of
the present as well as gaze into the future. An invitation to reflect on
empirical legal scholarship, with an emphasis on recent advances, is diffi-
cult to resist. Empirical legal scholarship's past, present, and future in-
tertwine as my brief accounting of the past frames my assessment of re-
cent advances. Although empirical legal scholarship benefits from an
enviable array of recent advances, this Article focuses on one-the in-
creased production of empirical legal scholarship over time. I note that
this growth roughly coincides with Professor Ulen's scholarly career and
that this relation is far from spurious.'
* Professor, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Dawn M. Chutkow and Nicole A. Heise, as well as
the participants in the Law and Economics Conference honoring Thomas S. Ulen at the University of Illinois
College of Law for their input on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to the librarians at Cornell Law
School for their excellent research support.
I. Indeed, not only did Professor Ulen observe this trend in 2002, but his own work contributed to it.
See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method
in the Study ofLaw, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875.
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During the early 1990s, leading intellectual historians noted that
empirical scholarship (as traditionally construed 2) had "not caught on" in
the U.S. legal academy. Similarly, writing in 2002, Professor Ulen (and
coauthor Richard McAdams) observed that the "systematic organization
of data and its presentation ... is not yet a routine part of legal argumen-
tation."4 The absence of data and analysis helped transform these obser-
vations into conventional wisdom. Indeed, explanations for the apparent
paucity of empirical legal research, especially those focusing on practical
barriers that impeded empirical research by law professors, resonated
with many.' Of course, the commonly held assumptions that empirical
legal scholarship had not yet "caught on" are, themselves, empirical in
nature. Insofar as such assumptions involved empirical legal scholars,
especially those not inclined to rely on intuitions, it was perhaps inevita-
ble that some of these very scholars would set out to subject some of the
commonly held assumptions to data and systematic analysis.
More specifically, scholars soon began to test the proposition that
empirical legal scholarship had not yet "caught on" with more rigor. In
particular, Professor Ellickson's citation study of legal scholarship trends
in 2000 included an assessment of empirical legal scholarship's growth in
law reviews between 1982 and 1996. Professor Ellickson's conclusion-
that the data only "hint[s] that law professors and students have become
more inclined to produce (although not consume) quantitative analy-
ses"-largely comported with prevailing wisdom though suggestive of
change.6 Six years later, Professor George updated Professor Ellickson's
study in 2006 and analyzed a more recent cohort of publications between
2. While I acknowledge that the point is disputed, when I speak of empirical legal scholarship, I refer
only to the subset of empirical legal scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses. By statistical
techniques and analyses, I mean to reference those studies that employ data (including systematically coded
judicial opinions) to describe or support inferences to a larger sample or population. Such studies must also be
amenable to replication by other scholars. My narrow definition of empirical legal scholarship admittedly
excludes a rich array of legal scholarship that can also plausibly be construed as empirical. (For one example
of an alternative definition of empirical legal studies, see, e.g., Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward
a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sa. 555
(2010).) While others may quibble with it, my narrow definition has the advantage of focusing on one of the
more visible and distinct types of empirical legal scholarship and sets it apart from its more traditional theoret-
ical and doctrinal counterparts. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance ofBeing Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV.
807, 810-11 (1999) [hereinafter Heise, Importance]; Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future ofEmpiri-
cal Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 820-21
[hereinafter Heise, New Empiricism]; Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Re-
search?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323 (1989).
3. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 445 (1995) ("Law and society
scholarship never really caught on in the American law schools."); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 252 (1995) ("Why has empirical legal research not caught on, not
taken hold in the law schools?").
4. Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Tribute to Gary T. Schwartz, Introduction, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REv. 791, 791 (discussing empirical and experimental methods in law). The authors also went on to note
"signs that empirical and experimental methods are becoming more common in legal scholarship." Id.
5. See, e.g., Heise, Importance, supra note 2, at 815-23; Schuck, supra note 2, at 325-26.
6. Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 528-
29 tbl.4 (2000).
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1994 and 2004. Professor George concluded that empirical legal scholar-
ship, or, more accurately, the number of references to it, "continues to
grow."7  Indeed, Professor George wrote in 2006 that empirical legal
scholarship "is arguably the next big thing in legal intellectual thought."I
Now that more than a decade has passed since Professor Ellickson's
study, and six years since Professor George's follow-up study, it is per-
haps time once again to revisit the question of whether empirical legal
studies have "caught on" in legal scholarship and whether it has, indeed,
become legal scholarship's next "big thing." That is, it would be useful to
know whether what Professor Ellickson detected as a "hint" in 2000, and
Professor George described in 2006 as a discernible trend, has persisted
or retreated.9 In Part I of this three-part Article, I review evidence of my
central claim: that the quantity of empirical legal scholarship has in-
creased over the past two decades. Part II considers possible reasons for
this increase and, in a nod to Professor Ulen (and the focus of this con-
ference), adopts a law and economics perspective. Specifically, I explain
the relatively recent surge in empirical legal scholarship as a function of
the increased supply of empirically minded legal scholars (who frequent-
ly - though not always - possess formal training in law and another field)
and the increased demand for such scholarship created by a growing
number of law reviews as well as specialty journals. Part III seeks to
briefly assess what to make of these findings and their implications for
law schools, legal education, and legal scholarship. In light of the sus-
tained ascendance of empirical legal studies, I conclude by proposing
that it is now appropriate to consider flipping the presumption surround-
ing empirical legal studies' station within the galaxy of legal scholarship.
Specifically, the salient question no longer is if empirical legal scholar-
ship will "catch on," but rather, why it took so long to do so.
I. EVIDENCE OF A RISE IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A. Data and Methodology
Quantitative assessments of changes in the production of empirical
legal scholarship over time must navigate important data and methodo-
logical hurdles. Such assessments require a database that accounts for a
large volume of legal scholarship that can also be systematically searched
at the individual article level. West Publishing's Journal and Law Re-
views (JLR) database contains most scholarly legal publications since at
7. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81
IND. L.J. 141, 147 (2006) (replicating and updating Professor Ellickson's 2000 study).
8. Id. at 141.
9. A related, though distinct study published in 2010 analyzes different types of empirical legal re-
search (primary vs. secondary data analyses) in a select number of student-edited law reviews (the proverbial
"top-30") in two distinct years (1998 and 2008). Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal
Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. So. 581 (2010).
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least 1990. Another hurdle is to identify words that serve as plausible
and consistent proxies for empirical legal scholarship. To better align
with past studies, I selected the words (or terms) empiric!, quantitat!, and
statistic! and searched for any one (or more) of these terms in the title of
a legal publication included in Westlaw's JLR database.
Obviously, one can fuss over whether the three terms used in this
study are the best possible terms or whether the focus on article titles
performs the desired analytical work. Potential quibbles aside, as it re-
lates to trends over time, the approach appears stable. Thus, even if this
selection protocol undercounts the actual amount of empirical legal
scholarship there is little reason to assume ex ante that such undercount-
ing will not be consistent and stable. Insofar as this study seeks to un-
cover possible trends, such measurement error-if it exists-is tolerable
(though, admittedly, far from ideal). Finally, the specific search words
used in this study have the virtue of linking this study with past efforts to
assess changes in the production of empirical legal scholarship.', In any
event, given the limitations of the JLR database as well as my search
strategy, one should regard the findings presented below as suggestive of
basic trends rather than specific point estimates.
Results in Figure 1 support my central claim as well as anecdotal
evidence that the production of empirical legal scholarship has increased
between 1990 and 2009. Notable is the smooth, almost linear, trend over
the past two decades. Visual inspection also suggests that the rate of in-
crease from 2000 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2009 appears to have acceler-
ated.
10. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 528-29 tbl.4.
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FIGURE 1:
TRENDS IN ARTICLE TITLES THAT REFLECT AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH:
ALL LAW JOURNALS, 1990-2009 (UNADJUSTED)
800
700
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1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
SOURCE: Westlaw JLR database, 1990-2009.
B. Adjusting for Changes in the Westlaw Database over Time
As Professor Ellickson (and others) have previously noted, another
key methodological hurdle for those seeking to detect changes in the
production of legal scholarship over time flows from the dynamic nature
of Westlaw's JLR database. This study begins with articles published in
calendar year 1990 as the Westlaw database was far from thorough prior
to the mid-1980s." Moreover, between 1990 and 2009, inclusive, West-
law's JLR database grew.12 As of 2010, the number of individual titles
included in the JLR database is 944.
Concurrent with changes to the universe of journals included in
Westlaw's JLR database over time are changes to coverage within indi-
vidual journals. When a new journal was added to the Westlaw database
in the early 1980s, it typically involved only "selective" coverage of that
journal's contents. By 1994, however, Westlaw's JLR database had
shifted to full content coverage for most journals.13
Owing to these two changes to Westlaw's JLR database during the
scope of this study, the raw number of articles in the database increased
between 1990 and 2009.14 These changes to the JLR database during the
11. Id.at521.
12. The number of titles in Westlaw's JLR database has grown steadily over the years: 397 in 1992, 566
in 1995, 699 in 2000, 806 in 2005, and 944 in 2010.
13. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 521.
14. Professor Ellickson notes a "roughly" ninefold increase between 1982 and 1996. Id.
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period of this study (1990-2009) require a technical adjustment. Without
a deflator that adequately neutralizes the independent influence of the
Westlaw JLR database growth over time, database growth could con-
tribute to an artificially inflated picture of the growth of empirical legal
scholarship."
To construct such a deflator, I drew from prior efforts in the litera-
ture, notably Professor Ellickson's citation study from one decade ago
and focused on two plausible deflator alternatives. One deflator flows
from the increase in the raw number of documents in the JLR database
between 1990 and 2009. The efficacy of this deflator rests on the assump-
tion that the character and nature of the typical JLR document did not
systematically change during the past two decades. If the assumption
holds, then a simple "raw document count" deflator would perform the
necessary work.
If one assumes that the "typical" JLR document did, in fact, system-
atically change over the past two decades, however, an alternative de-
flator is needed that accounts for changes in the documents themselves.
Similar to Professor Ellickson, I settled upon a "rare-word" deflator as
an alternative. The rare-word deflator reflects the trend in the number
of JLR documents that contain any one of ten "substantively neutral, or-
dinary English words that authors seldom use." 6 Assuming that these
"seldom used" words are seldom used equally over time, their usage
proxies for the increase in the JLR database.
Although both the raw document count and rare-word deflators il-
lustrate different approaches to remedying the influence of changes to
the size of the JLR database, each deflator rests on its own set of unique
assumptions. Fortunately, as the results in Table 1 make clear, both de-
flator alternatives largely mirror one another. Moreover, this finding
largely comports with Professor Ellickson's results from a decade earli-
er." Thus, so long as one of the deflator options is used, a decision about
which option is used becomes unimportant. To promote comparability
across studies and time, however, I settled upon the rare-word deflator
for this study.
15. As Professor Ellickson notes, efforts to deflate such databases have persisted. Id at 522 n.9. See
also Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 427, 435 nn.27 & 31 (2000) (deflating changes in the Social Science Citation Index database); Theodore
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 373, 384-85 (1998) (deflator-adjusting data obtained in searches conducted on different days).
16. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 522.
17. Id at 542 fig.Al. It should be noted, however, that Professor Ellickson's work on alternative deflat-
ors is far more extensive than mine.
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TABLE 1:
DEFLATION INDEXES FOR WESTLAW JLR DATABASE
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
Raw document count deflator 2.287 1.295 1.133 1.000
Rare-word deflator 1.921 1.266 1.122 1.000
SOURCE: Westlaw JLR database, 1990-2009.
NOTE: Base years = 2005-2009.
Figure 2, below, replicates Figure 1 after indexing for changes over
time to the Westlaw JLR database. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 under-
scores the need to account for the Westlaw database growth as the two
Figures convey slightly different pictures. Although the unadjusted re-
sults in Figure 1 imply a steady, smooth rise over the four five-year in-
crements, results that account for growth in the Westlaw JLR database
over the past two decades in Figure 2 illustrate that empirical scholarship
was essentially flat during the 1990s and has steadily risen since. Thus,
while changes to the size of the Westlaw JLR database or the nature of
the JLR documents themselves from 1990 to 1999 account for the rise in
empirical legal scholarship, conveyed in Figure 1, such changes do not
explain the increase observed in Figure 2 from 2000 to 2009. Thus, the
increase during the twenty-first century's first decade can be construed as
a "real" increase.
The adjusted results presented in Figure 2 largely comport with Pro-
fessor Ellickson's assessment of his review of 1982-1996 data as well as
Professor George's findings for 1994-2004. Professor Ellickson noted a
"hint" of an increase18 and a similar hint is discernable in Figure 2 from
1990 to 1994 and from 1995 to 1999. The "hint" of an increase in the
production of empirical legal scholarship that Professor Ellickson noticed
in 1996, however, has blossomed into a palpable increase since then that,
if anything, has increased in velocity during the past decade. Judgments
about whether these findings support the conclusion that empirical legal
scholarship has become the "next big thing" are inherently subjective
and, in any event, require more data.
18. Id at 528-29 tbl.4.
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FIGURE 2:
INDEXED TRENDS IN ARTICLE TITLES
THAT REFLECT AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH:
ALL LAW JOURNALS, 1990-2009
800
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200 -
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1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
SOURCE: Westlaw JLR database, 1990-2009.
NOTE: Base years = 2005-2009.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RISE IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES
What accounts for the rise in empirical legal scholarship? As rea-
sons for the increase in empirical legal scholarship have been previously
discussed, 9 and out of respect for Professor Ulen's economics training, I
will limit my discussion to two specific, though related, explanations that
emerge with greater clarity from a law and economics perspective. One
reason is that, on the supply side of the equation, an ever-increasing
number of law professors possess either formal training in an array of so-
cial science fields (including, but not limited to, economics) or a substan-
tial appreciation for social scientific methodologies. This increased
supply in the pool of empirically inclined legal scholars has led to an in-
creased production of empirical legal scholarship. A second reason, con-
current with (and, to some degree, a function of) an increased supply, is
an increased demand for empirical legal scholarship by a growing num-
ber of specialty law journals expressly devoted to empirical legal scholar-
ship. The interaction of these two factors-an increased supply of, and
demand for, empirical legal scholarship-helps account for the rise il-
19. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741,
1741-46 (2004); Heise, New Empiricism, supra note 2, at 826-32.
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lustrated in Figure 2. These two factors also help explain Professor
Ulen's important contributions to this trend.
A. More Law-School-Based Scholars with Greater Social Science
Preferences: The Supply of Empirical Legal Scholars and Relevant Data
Few teaching in law schools today would dispute the observation
that the various changes to law faculty demographics over time include a
greater presence of faculty that either possess only an advanced degree
other than law or, more commonly, possess both a law degree as well as
an advanced degree in a field other than law. Moreover, although help-
ful data sets remain a relatively scarce commodity, the number and utility
of data sets germane to legal scholars have increased over time. As the
supply of law professors with the necessary empirical skills and the num-
ber of relevant data sets increase, the cost of producing empirical legal
scholarship falls. Finally, other barriers to empirical legal scholars, in-
cluding attitudes and norms within the legal academy, recede over time
and reduce the professional costs associated with pursuing an empirical
research agenda. As associated costs fall, classic economic theory pre-
dicts an increase in production of empirical legal scholarship. On this
prediction, economic theory gets it right.
Data on the major pool from which law faculty hiring committees
draw evidences an increase in the number of empirically minded law pro-
fessors. Many (but not all) candidates seeking to enter the law teaching
market participate in the annual Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) conference that is designed to facilitate the collision of supply
(those seeking law faculty appointments) and demand (law school hiring
committees seeking to identify and hire promising candidates).20 Candi-
dates participating in the annual conference complete a one-page form
that is collected by the AALS and distributed to law schools in an annual
Faculty Appointments Registrar (FAR). The candidate's one-page re-
gis-trar form distills critical information, including any advanced degrees
held by the candidates. From 2006 to 2008, the raw number of candi-
dates seeking to join law faculties that possess both a law degree as well
as an advanced degree in a field other than law increased over 45 percent
(from 64 to 93).21 Moreover, the proportion of dual-degreed faculty can-
didates similarly increased from 7 to 10.6 percent during these three
years. The 2006-2008 data, however, merely captures the tip of a palpa-
20. For an extensive description of the entry-level law professor market, see David W. Case, The Peda-
gogical Don Quixote de la Mississippi, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 529, 530-33 (2003).
21. See Pati Abdullina, 2006-2007 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, Ass'N AM. L. SCH., http://
www.aals.org/statistics/0607/FAR-spss/degree.html (last visited July 19, 2011); Pati Abdullina, 2008-2009
AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, AsS'N AM. L. SCH., http://www.aals.org/statisties/2009far/degrees.
html (last visited July 19, 2011).
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ble trend that has been unfolding over the past decade.22 The relative
and absolute number of law faculty with formal empirical training is im-
portant as such training reduces the cost of producing empirical legal
scholarship.
Another traditional barrier to the production of empirical legal
scholarship is the paucity of relevant data germane to legal issues of in-
terest. Of course, scholars remain free to undertake the oftentimes Her-
culean task of creating a useful data set. Such a task, however, often im-
poses consequential investments of time, energy, and resources.
Institutions, such as the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice
Statistics, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the National
Center for State Courts, play a critical role by generating an increasing
number of data sets that inform legal research questions. State-level data
with demonstrated interest to many legal scholars include multiyear data
sets on civil justice,23 and data sets generated by the U.S. Administrative
Office are frequently germane to research questions involving federal
courts.24
Finally, a shift in attitudes and norms about empirical scholarship
within the legal academy further reduces barriers for the empirically in-
clined legal scholar. Not too long ago, the unmistakable ethos among
law faculty either looked down or askance at legal scholars pursuing em-
pirical research. Even as recently as 2003, Professor Landes notes, "[i]t
would only be a modest exaggeration to say that most law professors re-
gard empirical work as a form of drudgery not worthy of first-class
minds." 25 One consequence of this ethos is a palpable attitude that pref-
erences theoretical work over empirical work of equivalent quality in the
legal academy. 26
Although legal theory continues to occupy an exalted seat at the
high table of legal academia, empirical legal scholarship's status has risen
over time. Not surprisingly, the market has responded to this attitudinal
shift. Not only do an ever-increasing number of those seeking to become
law professors claim an expertise in various empirical methods, but law
22. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Empirical Side ofLaw & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 167, 167
(2003) (noting the high number of JD/PhDs in economics on the University of Chicago Law School faculty);
Ulen, supra note 1, at 916 (observing that JD/PhD candidates "are among the most highly sought entrants into
the legal academy").
23. For examples of recent scholarship that has used these types of data sets, see, e.g., Theodore Eisen-
berg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577 (2010);
Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to
the Supreme Court?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, (2011); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and
Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001
Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 264-65 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability ofPuni-
tive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 624-25 (1997).
24. For examples of recent scholarship that has used these types of data sets, see, e.g., Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in US. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 441, 452 (2007).
25. Landes, supra note 22, at 180.
26. Id.
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schools themselves have begun to highlight their commitment to empiri-
cal legal studies through centers, programs, and conferences." While
empirical legal studies do not pose any immediate threat to legal theory's
lofty stature among legal academics, it is safe to say that legal empiricists
are no longer viewed as second-class citizens by their "pure theory"
counterparts.
B. An Increase in the Number of Law Reviews and Specialty Journals:
The Growing Demand for Empirical Legal Scholarship
An increased demand for empirical legal scholarship complements
an increased supply of empirical legal research. An increase in the num-
ber of specialty journals focusing on empirical legal scholarship accounts
for some of the rise in demand. When it comes to explaining the growth
of empirical legal scholarship (as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2), however,
an anomaly in the Westlaw JLR database may actually lead to an under-
counting of empirical legal scholarship. It stands to reason, of course,
that the emergence of leading peer-reviewed journals that focus on em-
pirical legal scholarship, such as the Journal of Law and Economics in
1958, Law & Society Review in 1966, the Journal of Legal Studies in 1972,
the American Law and Economics Review in 1999, the Journal of Empir-
ical Legal Studies' in 2004, and, even more recently, the Journal of Legal
Analysis in 2009, would contribute to a net rise in empirical publications.
At least one of the more recent journals, the Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies, does not yet appear in Westlaw's JLR database. Thus, to the ex-
tent that articles published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
would have appeared in other journals included in the Westlaw JLR da-
tabase, then the results presented in Figures 1 and 2 likely understate the
growth in empirical legal scholarship.
III. WHAT TO MAKE OF THE INCREASE IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP?
Judge (and former Professor) Harry Edwards famously lamented
about a growing rift between his perception of legal scholarly trends and
the needs of the legal profession.29 The American Bar Association simi-
larly complains about a sense of "abandonment" of the legal profession's
needs by law schools, especially elite law schools.30 Many leading legal
27. See Suchman & Mertz, supra note 2, at 557-58.
28. In the interest of full disclosure, I have coedited the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies since 2005.
29. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) ("[M]any law schools ... have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.").
30. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL
EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
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scholars, such as Professor Deborah Rhode, feel that law school faculty
should be mindful of a duty to advance "understanding and promote im-
provement of their profession and its institutions."31 Although in some
ways empirical legal scholarship forms something of an easy target for
critics, in other ways, however, empirical work is particularly well posi-
tioned to help bridge the gap, real or perceived, between the legal acad-
emy and profession.
Critics of empirical perspectives on legal questions note that the
empirical movement discounts more traditional (and more familiar) legal
analysis. Moreover, critics also assail some empirical research for failing
to achieve its own objectives. For example, in pointing out flaws with
empirical efforts to study federal appellate courts, scholars and judges
point out that judicial decision-making models have been, thus far, un-
able to quantify judicial deliberations with accuracy.32 That such flaws
exist should surprise few, especially for empirical scholarship published
in the numerous student-edited law reviews. That specific problems,
ranging from "[s]loppy survey techniques, skewed samples, and sweeping
generalizations from unrepresentative findings,"" find their way into
published law reviews will surprise only those unfamiliar with the tradi-
tion of student-edited law reviews. That editorial selections and deci-
sions made by law students will falter on occasion is inevitable.34 Owing
partly to these problems, and others, some critics already question
whether the current increase in empirical legal scholarship will last.
Given a context that already views legal scholarship with suspicion,
the ascendance of empirical legal scholarship can easily be viewed as ex-
acerbating a "gap," real or perceived, between legal scholars and practi-
tioners. A turn in legal scholarship towards coefficients, regression equa-
tions, standard errors, and many other arcane, technical aspects can
easily fuel an argument that a rift between the legal profession's needs
and law professors' wants has grown. Though such an outcome is entire-
ly plausible, it is not inevitable. Indeed, to the extent that empirical legal
scholarship provides some clarity on legal systems and how they func-
tion, such work can contribute to a narrowing of the gap between schol-
ars and practitioners. Thus, I strongly suspect that even Judge Edwards
and the authors of the MacCrate Report would approve of most, though
assuredly not all, of today's empirical legal scholarship.
See also Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and
Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 348 (1995).
31. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1330 (2002).
32. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Under-
stand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DuKE L.J. 1895, 1963-66 (2009).
33. Rhode, supra note 31, at 1343.
34. Id. at 1356. Of course, a limited but growing number of law-school-based, peer-reviewed journals
that specialize in empirical legal scholarship exist. Examples include the University of Chicago's Journal of
Legal Studies, Cornell's Journal ofEmpirical Legal Studies, and Harvard's Journal ofLegal Analysis.
35. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Law's Misguided Love Affair with Science, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 95,
111 (2009).
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As Professor Nard notes, however, empirical scholarship is almost
uniquely positioned to gauge the effect and efficacy, or lack thereof, of
legal rules, decisions, and statutes.36 Many judges, lawmakers, and law-
yers want to know the societal consequences of their decisions and ac-
tions. Empirical legal scholarship can speak to this need by engaging
such questions. Echoing a similar theme, then-Stanford Law School
Dean, Kathleen Sullivan, described the "increasingly empirical study of
law" as "one of the most dramatic trends in recent legal scholarship."'
What Dean Sullivan found particularly attractive was the promise empir-
ical legal scholarship held for increasing our "knowledge of how law
works." 38 Finally, Professor Eisenberg notes how high-quality empirical
scholarship can contribute to more accurate descriptions and analyses of
how our legal system actually operates and is relevant to all those with a
stake in the administration of justice.3 1
IV. CONCLUSION: PROFESSOR TOM ULEN'S LEGACY
AND REFRAMING QUESTIONS
For decades, intellectual historians have considered whether empir-
ical legal scholarship has finally "caught on," especially among legal aca-
demics. Results from this study support the proposition that while em-
pirical work has, indeed, finally "caught on," a clear acceleration in the
production of empirical legal scholarship did not emerge until the twen-
ty-first century. The present surge in empirical legal scholarship largely
corresponds with the "sweet spot" of Professor Tom Ulen's remarkable
scholarly career.40 But perhaps such a perspective misses a larger and
more important point. Specifically, perhaps a more incisive question is
not when did empirical legal scholarship finally "arrive" but, rather, why
did it take so long?
As a Stanford-trained economist, Professor Ulen's journey through
the legal academy has assuredly seemed a bit odd to him at times. The
paucity of empirical legal scholarship prior the 1990s bewildered many
social scientists and, especially, economists. Too many critical legal ques-
tions (and theories) literally cry out for rigorous, systematic, empirical
testing. Most of the social science disciplines related to law, such as
36. Nard, supra note 30, at 349-50.
37. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1217, 1222 (2002).
38. Id.
39. Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise ofEmpirical Legal Studies and a Response
to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1713.
40. Emblematic of Professor Ulen's contribution to the recent surge of empirical legal scholarship is his
contribution (along with University of Illinois colleagues Robert Lawless and Jennifer Robbennolt) to the pub-
lication of a new casebook for the field, ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2009). The
publication of this new casebook makes the lives of those considering developing an empirical methods class
for the law school environment a bit easier.
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economics, benefit from a strong empirical tradition and ethos. 41 Empiri-
cal methods, statistics, and econometrics are baked into most economists'
graduate training. Rather than relying on anecdotes, one's intuition, or
instinct, theory fuels research hypotheses that, in turn, are submitted to
data for testing and falsification. Increasingly, data are being developed
that address such questions with the needs of legal scholars in mind. Pro-
fessor Ulen's own publications list reflects this approach (as well, of
course, his economics training). Professor Ulen has consistently sub-
jected his own intuitions to the rigor of data. Recent topics that Profes-
sor Ulen has explored range from the composition of the legal academy 42
to the growing presence of law and economics in leading law reviews. 43
Indeed, this symposium honoring Professor Ulen's retirement
serves as both a symbolic capstone not only to a wonderfully rich aca-
demic career, but also to Professor Ulen's and the University of Illinois
College of Law's deep engagement with empirical legal studies. Almost
one decade ago, Professor Ulen was the moving force behind an excep-
tionally successful symposium (also hosted at the University of Illinois
College of Law) focusing on empirical and experimental methods in law
that involved scholars drawn from an array of formal academic disci-
plines, including economics, and reflected a diverse set of methodological
perspectives and tools." At that time, Professor Ulen (and coauthor Pro-
fessor Richard McAdams) noted that "[e]mpiricism is also a unifying
theme of several of the increasingly influential interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to the study of law." 45 On this point, Professor Ulen is a classic
"participant-observer." That is, not only was Professor Ulen's observa-
tion about empirical legal studies capacity for influence and unification in
legal scholarship apt, but his wonderfully rich scholarly career helped
make his observation come to life. And for that, those of us who benefit
by standing upon Professor Ulen's scholarly shoulders owe a significant
debt. Knowing Professor Ulen as I do, I am certain his admonition to the
beneficiaries of his work, including myself, would be for us to do our best
to contribute to the knowledge base in a way that benefits the scholars
behind us.
41. But cf Landes, supra note 22, at 171-72 (arguing that the subfield of law and economics is less em-
pirical than the economics field generally).
42. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Impending Train Wreck in Current Legal Education: How We Might
Teach Law As the Scientific Study of Social Governance, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 302, 329 tbl.1 (2009) (citing
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 206 (2004)).
43. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics
in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1555, 1569-70 tbl.1 (2008).
44. I had the pleasure of participating in the symposium. See Heise, New Empiricism, supra note 2.
45. McAdams & Ulen, supra note 4, at 791.
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